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Introduction
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has pub-
licly endorsed a legislative resolution that would
make zero inflation, or price-level stability, the
overriding long-run objective of the Federal Re-
serve System. Price-level stability means a policy
intended to keep the price level reasonably con-
stant over long horizons. That is, although the
price level may fluctuate temporarily in response
to transitory real output and money demand
shocks, permanent shifts in money demand and
in real output would be offset in order to ensure
that the long-run price level is stationary.
The term zero inflation is commonly used as
a synonym for price-level stability. Care must be
taken to distinguish this usage from a monetary
growth rule that would result in zero expected
inflation in the long run, but that could cause
wide deviations of the price level from a con-
stant trend as the income velocity of money
shifts. Price-level stability should also be distin-
guished from a zero-inflation target in which
the central bank tries to achieve zero inflation in
every month or quarter. Such a strategy allows
target misses to accumulate, which in turn
allows the price level to follow a random walk.
In principle, a price-level rule would not pre-
clude temporary policies to stabilize the business
cycle. In practice, such a rule would remove un-
certainty about the long-run price level and would
be, in our judgment, the best policy to ensure sus-
tained economic growth. Admittedly, economists
have not offered much formal analysis in support
of this issue.
Policymakers, however, are often required to
make choices regardless of whether academic
debates have been fully resolved. In order to ad-
vance the research about the role of inflation in
the design of monetary policy, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland sponsored a Conference
on Price Stability in November 1990. The full pro-
ceedings of the conference appear in the August
1991 issue oi the Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking} In particular, we asked the participat-
ing economists to explain what recent develop-
ments in macroeconomic research have taught us
about the optimal inflation policy.
The most widely cited origin of the optimal
inflation literature is a 1969 article by Milton
• 1 Authors cited in this paper without a referenced year were con-
ference participants, and complete citations of their papers can be found
in the reference list.Friedman, which explains why optimal inflation
is achieved by allowing the money supply to
grow (shrink) at a rate that results in a zero
nominal interest rate. Here, Friedman estimates
that this result would be achieved if the money
supply were forced to grow at a relatively con-
stant 2 percent rate. Assuming that the marginal
cost of fiat money is zero, a zero nominal inter-
est rate leads people to hold the optimal quan-
tity of cash balances. This policy has become
known as the "Chicago rule."
The Chicago rule is based on the assumption
that government can raise revenue with a nondis-
torting tax. In response, Phelps (1973) presents a
model in which only distorting taxes are available
to replace the seigniorage lost when eliminating a
moderate inflation. He shows that the trend infla-
tion rate should be chosen so that the marginal
welfare cost of the last dollar raised through infla-
tion is equal to the marginal welfare cost of the
last dollar raised through other taxes. A large body
of literature debates the relevance of Phelps' criti-
cism of Friedman's rule.
2 Whether Friedman's
rule is optimal or whether some positive inflation
rate would be preferred depends importantly on
the role of money in the economy (medium of ex-
change, store of value, or unit of account) and on
the alternative revenue sources available to the
government. Resolving the issue requires consid-
erably more detail about the economy than Fried-
man and Phelps presented in their respective
partial-equilibrium models.
Our discussion of the six papers presented at
the Conference on Price Stability is organized
around two policy issues. The first is the implica-
tion of the papers for the optimal inflation trend —
the Friedman-Phelps debate; the second is the
implication for the degree of variability of inflation
around the trend. We begin section I with a
description of the Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
paper, which derives the optimal mix of monetary
and fiscal policy rules. Henning Bohn's evaluation
of the sustainability of fiscal policies in a stochastic
environment follows naturally from this discus-
sion. Section II includes an extended explanation
of the Cooley and Hansen paper, which attempts
to measure the net welfare cost of policies that
would reduce inflation to zero and replace the
lost seigniorage with higher taxes on capital or
labor. Altig and Carlstrom then focus on the inter-
action of inflation with the nominal tax system.
Section III describes the Imrohoroglu and Prescott
paper, which calculates the efficiency of the sei-
gniorage tax under alternative institutional
• 2 Woodford (1990) summarizes much of this literature and gives a
detailed analysis of the assumptions underlying Friedman's rule.
arrangements. Section IV discusses Laurence
Ball's explanation of why attempts to eliminate
inflation almost always lead to recession. In sec-
tion V, we conclude with a summary of the





In "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Some
Recent Results," V.V. Chari, Lawrence Christiano,
and Patrick Kehoe derive the optimal inflation
policy jointly with the optimal tax policy. Using a
stochastic, equilibrium business cycle framework,
they work out the optimal labor and capital tax
policies in a two-factor production economy, and
the optimal inflation tax in a one-factor produc-
tion economy without capital. They follow Lucas
and Stokey (1983) in assuming a cash-in-advance
role for money; some goods are purchased with
cash and others with credit.
Chari et al. present four interesting results from
the analysis of these models. First, they show that
the optimal policy implies that either government
debt or capital taxes should be indexed to govern-
ment consumption and productivity shocks. For
example, during a war or some positive shock to
government consumption, the value of govern-
ment debt should decline. This enables the gov-
ernment to avoid raising taxes during a war. They
argue that because debt is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to index, monetary policy should be used to
provide the appropriate ex post real payments.
Over the business cycle, policy should be set so
that money varies positively with government con-
sumption and negatively with productivity shocks.
Contrary to Barro (1979), they find that opti-
mal tax rates on labor do not follow a random
walk, but inherit the persistence properties of the
underlying shocks and, for practical purposes,
are roughly constant over the business cycle. The
difference seems to arise because Barro does
not allow government the right to issue state-
contingent debt. Henning Bohn, in the paper
discussed later in this section, shows that tax
smoothing is, in general, not sustainable in the
absence of state-contingent government debt.
Third, Chari et al. show that capital taxes
should be zero on average in a stochastic steady
state. This extends the results of Chamley
(1986), who shows that the optimal tax on capi-
tal income is zero in a deterministic steady state.
Although Chari et al. indicate that steady-state
capital taxes are zero, state-by-state capital taxesare not uniquely determined in a model with
state-contingent government debt. Equivalently,
the optimal level of indexing for government
debt is not uniquely determined given state-
contingent capital taxation.
Finally, they analyze optimal monetary policy
in an economy without capital. In this model,
Friedman's rule holds even in the presence of
distorting taxes: A zero nominal interest rate
prevails in every period. The intuition is simply
that the optimal policy taxes both credit and
cash goods at the same rate. This occurs when
all revenue is raised through a tax on labor in-
come. Without capital, a wage tax is equivalent
to a consumption tax, where both cash and
credit goods are taxed at the same rate.
In his comments on Chari et al.'s paper, R.
Anton Braun shows that the optimality of Fried-
man's rule also depends on the particular form of
preferences chosen; that is, utility is homogeneous
in degree k with respect to both types of goods.
Also, leisure is weakly separable from both cash
and credit goods. Braun argues that empirical
evidence from money-demand studies does not
support this preference structure. Instead, he con-
tends that the cash good is weakly separable from
both the credit good and leisure, and that utility is
homogeneous in degree k in leisure and in the
credit good. This form of utility implies that wage
taxes should equal zero and that efficient tax struc-
ture includes positive inflation.
If government debt cannot be indexed to
either government consumption or productivity
shocks, and if capital taxes cannot be made con-
tingent on these shocks, then monetary policy
can be used to effectively index the real return
on fixed nominal government debt. Although
the optimal policy results in a zero nominal in-
terest rate, Friedman's result that money should
be deflated each period at the rate of time
preference is far from optimal.
Ex ante, the expected level of deflation in each
period will equal the real interest rate. Thus, with
the nominal interest rate on government debt be-
ing equal to zero in every period, the expected
amount of deflation will be set such that, ex ante,
the rate of return on all assets will be equal (al-
though the Chari et al. monetary model does not
actually include private capital). However, be-
cause monetary policy is being used to effectively
index government debt, ex post optimal monetary
policy results in an inflation rate that has a very
large variance around a near-zero trend. Thus,
while seigniorage should not be part of an optimal
tax policy, substantial amounts of inflation and
deflation should exist in order to decrease the real
value of government debt during wars or negative
technology shocks and to increase the real
value of government debt during booms.
Henning Bohn also discusses the issue of in-
dexed government debt in "The Sustainability
of Budget Deficits with Lump-Sum and with In-
come-Based Taxation." Bohn uses a stochastic
environment to analyze the feasibility of some
commonly recommended fiscal policies. Al-
though his paper is not directly aimed at the
issue of price stability, it has important implica-
tions for analyzing alternative inflation policies.
His method could be extended to examine the
sustainability of specific monetary policies in a
stochastic environment.
Bohn considers the sustainability of two fiscal
policies, a tax-smoothing policy and a balanced
budget, under two different assumptions about
the tax collection mechanism, a lump-sum and
an income-based tax. He defines these terms
carefully and shows that although many econo-
mists have espoused such policies and shown
them to be sustainable in a deterministic world,
they are not necessarily sustainable in a stochas-
tic environment. He argues that it is imperative
to specify the complete general-equilibrium en-
vironment, including the incentives of taxpayers
and the constraints on tax collectors, when ex-
amining these issues.
Bohn shows that both tax-smoothing and a
balanced budget are typically sustainable if the
government is able to levy lump-sum taxes, but
not if taxation is limited by the amount of in-
come. He also demonstrates that in an uncertain
environment, state-contingent government debt
can be used to design sustainable versions of
tax-smoothing and balanced budget policies.
Like Chari et al., Bohn argues that inflation pol-
icy might be used to index government debt. He
shows that a tax-smoothing policy can be main-
tained in a stochastic environment if inflation is
perfectly negatively correlated with real output.
The optimal inflation rate in Chari et al. actually
has very little correlation with changes in output
due to government consumption shocks.
Together, these papers indicate that govern-
ment debt should be indexed. In theory, monetary
policy could be used to accomplish this. Lucas and
Stokey (1983) argue that, at least in the years fol-
lowing wars, monetary policy has been used to re-
tire a substantial amount of the real value of
outstanding government debt. However, this ex
post indexing has not occurred on the scale pro-
posed by Chari et al. Inflation has rarely exceeded
10 percent in the United States, while their model
proposes that a third of the time inflation should
either be greater than 20 percent or lower than
-20 percent.II. The Efficiency
of Seigniorage
Thomas Cooley and Gary Hansen measure the net
welfare effects of a policy to eliminate inflation,
starting from the current pattern of effective tax
rates on labor and capital. They begin with a real
business cycle model that includes an indivisible
labor supply specification and a cash-in-advance
role for money. Like Chad et al, they use the
Lucas-Stokey setup with cash and credit goods.
Their baseline model is calibrated to fit the post-
war U.S. economy, and baseline tax rates are set
at historical averages: a 23-percent effective tax on
labor and a 50-percent effective tax on capital.
The first experiment is to reduce inflation from
5, 10, or 20 percent to zero. In their simulations,
Cooley and Hansen show that the welfare costs of
inflation are substantially larger than those esti-
mated by Fischer (1981). In his comment on this
paper, Roland Benabou uses the Cooley-Hansen
general equilibrium model to show analytically
that inflation is much more costly than is implied
by the usual partial -equilibrium estimates (the
area represented by the Harberger triangle under
the demand curve for money).
Although Cooley and Hansen argue that the
benefits of ending inflation are greater than pre-
viously thought, eliminating inflation actually
makes people worse off, because, on the mar-
gin, keeping the inflation tax is more efficient
than increasing the tax on either capital or labor
income. In their model, Phelps' argument is cor-
rect. They show that eliminating inflation makes
people slightly worse off when the lost revenue
is replaced with higher taxes on labor income, and
makes them much worse off when the lost reve-
nue is replaced with higher taxes on capital. The
marginal welfare cost of revenue raised from the
capital tax is already so high that attempting to ex-
tract extra revenue from this source is very costly.
The policy conclusions drawn by Cooley and
Hansen for their model economy are straightfor-
ward. At the margin, the inflation tax is clearly
less burdensome than either labor or capital
taxes. The government can make people better
off by raising inflation and lowering other taxes,
particularly the capital tax. This conclusion is in
contrast to that reached by Chart et al., who find
that Friedman's rule holds.
Both papers use a cash-in-advance specifica-
tion for the role of money. The important differ-
ence is that Chan et al. exclude capital when
analyzing optimal monetary policy, which makes
their labor tax equivalent to a consumption tax. In
both papers, inflation is a tax on cash goods, driv-
ing a wedge between cash and credit goods.
With capital, an inflation tax shares the properties
of a consumption tax in that it is a lump-sum tax
on the existing capital stock. If Chart et al. ex-
tended their monetary model to include capital,
Friedman's rule would no longer be optimal.
Similarly, however, if either Cooley and Hansen
or Chart et al. extended their papers to allow for a
consumption tax that equally taxes both cash and
credit goods, Friedman's rule of a zero nominal in-
terest rate would again be optimal.
In Cooley and Hansen's model, the tax code is
perfectly indexed for inflation. They assume that
the effective tax rate on capital income is 50 per-
cent, based on real-world studies in which the
capital tax was not indexed for inflation. In reality,
the effective capital tax rate was as high as 50 per-
cent only because inflation averaged about 5 per-
cent and because nominal rather than real returns
were taxed. If the real rate of return to capital
were 5 percent and the inflation rate were 5 per-
cent, then a 25 percent tax on nominal capital in-
come would be a 50 percent tax on real capital
income. If the Fed actually went to zero inflation,
the effective capital tax would decline unless Con-
gress increased the tax rate. One can argue that
Congress made such an adjustment in the early
1980s when inflation was reduced from 10 per-
cent to 4 percent. The effective capital tax had
been reduced in 1981, but was raised again by the
Economic Reform Tax Act of 1983 and by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
With nominal taxation of capital income, the
Federal Reserve can lower the effective capital
tax rate by lowering the inflation rate. Indeed,
that is one of the arguments in favor of zero in-
flation. Cooley and Hansen generously agreed
to run one further experiment in which the infla-
tion rate was lowered to zero and the capital tax
rate was cut to 25 percent to simulate the
reduced capital tax that would occur with re-
duced inflation.
3 This experiment approxi-
mately represents the sort of policy change that
would result if the Fed lowered the current infla-
tion trend to zero and if Congress made up the
lost revenue by raising the rates in the personal
income tax code. The simulation shows that
when the lost revenue from both seigniorage
and the capital tax is made up with a higher
wage tax, welfare increases by approximately
0.56 percent of GNP.
4
• 3 The assumed real rate is 4 percent in the Cooley and Hansen
paper, instead of the 5 percent rate that was assumed in our calculations.
• 4 Cooley and Hansen report that the steady-state welfare gain is
approximately 2.6 percent of GNP.In "Inflation, Personal Taxes, and Real Output:
A Dynamic Analysis," David Altig and Charles
Carlstrom analyze the interaction between infla-
tion and the taxation of nominal capital income.
They use a stochastic version of the overlapping-
generations model developed by Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) to examine both steady-state and
business cycle consequences of changes in capital
tax rates induced by changes in the inflation
rate. There is no explicit model of money;
rather, inflation is introduced as exogenous
changes in an arbitrary unit of account. This
simple framework allows marginal tax rates to
be endogenous in a world with a graduated in-
come tax. The authors concentrate on the inter-
action between the personal tax code and the
inflation rate and ignore distortions associated
with corporate taxation of capital.
Altig and Carlstrom find that changes in the
inflation trend have large effects on the steady-
state capital stock and hence on output. They
estimate that steady-state output is approximately
5 percent lower than it would be if inflation
were eliminated or equivalently if capital in-
come were indexed. Although the authors do
not investigate the welfare consequences of
reducing inflation, their subsequent simulations
show that, in the steady state, a worker just
entering the labor force would need a one-time
compensation equal to 0.75 percent of his or
her "full lifetime wealth" in order to compensate
for having a 4 percent inflation rather than zero
(or perfect indexation of capital income).
The decrease in steady-state output in their
model is almost entirely due to the negative
effect that the nominal taxation of nominal capi-
tal income has on the capital stock. The rate of
inflation has almost no influence on steady-state
hours worked, because the substitution and in-
come effects cancel. In contrast to their steady-
state results, Altig and Carlstrom find that the
variability of inflation has little effect on the
cyclical variability of capital, but has a substan-
tial impact on the cyclical behavior of labor.
Inflation affects the cyclical properties of
hours worked for two reasons. First, it raises the
effective tax rate on capital income and lowers
the return on savings. This causes people to sub-
stitute intertemporally toward both consumption
and leisure. Second, although wages are assumed
to be indexed for inflation, capital income is not.
Thus, rising inflation causes capital income to
• 5 Their simulations assume that the lost revenue from reducing in-
flation is replaced through a proportional increase in the income tax. Full
wealth is defined to be the present discounted value of a person's wage
income assuming that all nonsleeping hours are spent working.
be overstated and, with a graduated income tax,
throws savers into higher tax brackets. In this
model, variable inflation has little effect on
short-run fluctuations in real economic activity.
Nevertheless, variable inflation increases the
variability of hours worked and decreases the
covariance between hours worked and output.
Altig and Carlstrom report that the short-run
price instability typical of postwar U.S. history
has had little impact on the real economy. Their
analysis supports the notion that we should
have a "zero expected inflation" target in order
to effectively cut the tax rate on capital; how-
ever, in their model, there are no further gains
from adopting an explicit path for the price
level as a long-run objective. These observations
are based on the reported real effects from vari-




In "Seigniorage as a Tax: A Quantitative Evalua-
tion," Ayse Imrohoroglu and Edward Prescott ex-
amine the efficiency of the inflation tax under
different assumptions about monetary institutions.
The authors use a model with a simple one-factor
production function and calibrate it using actual
U.S. data. Instead of assuming that money is held
for transaction purposes (as do Chari et al. and
Cooley and Hansen), they specify a model in
which money serves as a store of value to smooth
consumption over time. There are two assets in
the model, large-denomination government bonds
and money. Banks take deposits from households
and buy government bonds. The alternative to sei-
gniorage is a tax on labor income. In each case,
the revenue lost from reducing inflation is recov-
ered with enough extra revenue from the labor
tax to keep the government's budget balanced.
Imrohoroglu and Prescott consider three
scenarios: (1) a case with 100 percent reserve
requirements, in which currency is the only
store of value, (2) a case in which monetary pol-
icy is uncertain from period to period, but
everyone knows the trend inflation rate, and (3)
a case with fractional reserves.
With 100 percent reserve requirements, only
money is available to smooth consumption.
Consequently, the welfare costs of inflation can
be two to three times higher than the costs typi-
cally measured by the Harberger triangle under
the money demand curve. Again, this is also the
result that Benabou found in his analysis of
Cooley and Hansen's paper.Thus, in two separate models with two veiy dif-
ferent assumptions about the purpose of holding
money, general equilibrium measures of the cost
of inflation (non-revenue-compensated) are sig-
nificantly greater than the partial-equilibrium
measures. Contrary to Cooley and Hansen, how-
ever, Imrohoroglu and Prescott find that when in-
come taxes are increased to compensate for lost
seigniorage, Friedman's rule is again optimal. This
result continues to hold when the model is modi-
fied to include fractional reserves. As expected,
allowing interest-bearing assets to smooth con-
sumption reduces the cost of inflation. Adding
short-run uncertainty about monetary policy im-
poses no additional welfare costs in this model.
The welfare costs of a variable inflation policy
that results in an average 4 percent inflation are
approximately identical to those where the




None of the five papers discussed above addresses
an important concern of traditional macroeco-
nomics — whether attempts to end inflation have
been a major cause of recessions. This issue is
advanced by Laurence Ball, who asks why efforts
to end inflation almost always seem to be associ-
ated with recessions. Ball accepts as a stylized fact
not only that all disinflations have been asso-
ciated with recessions, but also that, on aver-
age, announcements of disinflation have led to
recessions. He argues that neither of two simple
explanations alone — price stickiness as suggested
by New Keynesian economists, nor the lack of
credibility as suggested by New Classical econo-
mists — can explain these phenomena if expecta-
tions are rational.
Ball shows that nominal price rigidity, as repre-
sented in models with staggered price-setting
arrangements, cannot explain why ending infla-
tion causes recessions. By carefully distinguishing
between changes in the growth rate of money
and changes in the level of money, he explains
how a credible disinflationary policy will lead to a
boom in a model with staggered price setting. The
intuition behind this argument is simple: If price
setters expect inflation to decline, they will lower
prices immediately because they can readjust
prices only periodically. This immediate decline in
the price level will lead to an increase in real
balances and consequently in output. Thus, fixed-
price models alone cannot explain why disinfla-
tion leads to recessions.
He then argues that the New Classical expla-
nation — that disinflations cause recessions be-
cause policy announcements are not credible
— also is incomplete. If policy is partly credible
(that is, if the Fed announces disinflation and
sometimes follows through), market-clearing
models predict that announcements of disinfla-
tion will sometimes lead to recession. The aver-
age expectation will be that the money growth
rate will decline, but not by as much as the cen-
tral bank announces. Sometimes actual money
growth will fall faster than the expectation (the
economy will recede); other times it will not (the
economy will expand). On average, in a New
Classical model with partial credibility, there
should be no correlation between announcements
of disinflation and deviations of output from trend.
This stylized fact that, on average, announce-
ments of disinflation lead to recession is based on
the controversial definition of announcements
contained in Romer and Romer (1989). They iden-
tify six such announcements of disinflation in the
postwar period, drawing sharp distinctions about
what constitutes an announcement where we
would not. If one believes that there were many
announcements of disinflation but only a few ac-
tions, then the probability of follow-through is
small. In the New Classical model in which policy
has almost no credibility for disinflation policies,
there is no reason to expect that false announce-
ments of disinflation would lead to recognizable
booms. However, true announcements of disinfla-
tion would lead to recessions.
After making the point that neither New
Keynesian nor New Classical ideas alone can ex-
plain why announcements of disinflation lead to
recessions, Ball notes that the two assumptions
together can explain why announced disinflations
on average lead to recessions and why actual dis-
inflationary episodes are followed by recessions.
Although these results occur even in the presence
of rational expectations, Ball suggests that per-
haps we should"... overcome our qualms about
adaptive expectations." He recommends the adap-
tive expectations assumption because it can ex-
plain both why ending inflation causes recessions
and why one-time macroeconomic shocks can




Although the practical policy implications of
these papers are limited, the discussions help us
to understand more fully some of the issuesinvolved in the Friedman-Phelps debate. The
resolution of this debate depends on the type of
taxation used to replace lost seigniorage. If a
consumption tax is feasible, Friedman's rule is
optimal. However, if lost revenue can be
replaced only with a wage, capital, or income
tax, then the resolution also depends partly on
the role of money in the economy.
When money is introduced into the model
with a cash-in-advance constraint, inflation is a
tax on consumption. Because a consumption
tax acts like a lump-sum tax on the capital
stock, some inflation will be part of an optimal
tax package in a cash-in-advance model. When
money is introduced into the model as a store of
value, Friedman's rule is optimal. However, such
models do not include private capital, and the
generality of the result is still open to question.
None of the papers in this conference pro-
vides a comprehensive answer to the policy-
maker's question about the optimal inflation
rate. No author has built a model to evaluate the
effect of inflation on the efficiency of the mone-
tary standard. Modeling money as a standard of
value is problematic because the tools of micro-
economic analysis assume away the frictions
that make a standard useful. Money exists to
facilitate trade and transactions — to make mar-
kets work more efficiently. Because we gener-
ally begin with models in which indexing is
costless, or in which the efficiency of the pay-
ments and accounting systems is independent of
the inflation policy, we should not be surprised
that inflation appears to be rather harmless.
Support for zero inflation can also be found in
the arguments contained in Altig and Carlstrom
(1991a, 1991b). The interaction between inflation
and the nominal tax system can result in signifi-
cant distortions. It is not clear why Congress
designed a tax system in which the effective cap-
ital tax rises with inflation. Perhaps legislators had
some sort of state-contingent tax plan in mind, or
perhaps they chose not to index the capital tax be-
cause of equity considerations. Another explana-
tion is simply that indexing is difficult to achieve.
Altig and Carlstrom (1991a) show that the index-
ing provisions for bracket creep contained in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1983 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 are imperfect and still result in
significant welfare losses.
The Friedman-Phelps debate centers on the
optimal trend in the inflation rate. Chan et al.
argue that constant inflation might not be opti-
mal because of the presence of nonindexed
debt. In their model, the government can use
inflation changes with nonindexed debt in
order to simulate indexed debt. Although their
argument has merit, it leaves many questions
unanswered. Can the government control the in-
flation rate precisely as needed to get the re-
quired pattern of real returns on government
debt? Does it have an incentive to do so? What
real-world uncertainties would accompany such
a radical change in policy?
Perhaps the strongest argument against price
stability per se (versus state-contingent inflation-
ary policy around a zero-inflation trend) is pre-
sented by Henning Bonn, who shows that a
policy of constant tax rates and a constant price
level is not sustainable in a stochastic environ-
ment. Further research is needed to determine
whether different operating strategies, for ex-
ample, constant money growth targets, constant
inflation targets, or a band around a path for the
price level, would satisfy the conditions for sus-
tainability.
An obvious gap exists between academic
analysis and the actual practice of monetary
policy. In theoretical modeling, the money supply
rule completes the model and enables the re-
searcher to determine the price level. In practice,
the money supply rule is not sufficiently well
defined to enable people to forecast inflation
accurately. Adopting any reasonable and explicit
rule may enhance economic performance by
reducing uncertainty about future inflation.
None of the papers in this conference addresses
the welfare or output effects of uncertainty
about policy and the future price level. The ra-
tionale for an explicit multiyear path for a price
index is based on the intuition that this uncer-
tainty matters. If it does, a credible multiyear tar-
get for a price index would greatly reduce
uncertainty about the future price level, elimi-
nate the unexpected changes in the inflation
trend that have been associated with recessions,
and enhance the efficient operation of our
accounting, contracting, and payments systems.References
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